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This SRP tracks a significant shift in U.S. attention toward Africa, given the continent's heightened strategic importance. It analyzes NATO's Partnership for Peace We are working in partnership with Africans and their friends throughout the international community to hasten the day when all Africans can have hope in their hearts, food on their tables, and a bright future for their children.
-Colin L. Powell Former Secretary of State
We live in a volatile and uncertain global environment shrouded by the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Globalization and transnational actors have fostered the spread of extremist ideologies to many parts of the world, including the African continent. In response, the United States has begun to re-think its strategic interests as they relate to Africa. These interests include energy, where 22% of its crude oil imports come from
Africa (surpassing what we currently import from the Middle East). This percentage is expected to increase to 25% by 2015. Given the proliferation of terrorism to more susceptible regions and the incessant challenges of poverty, disease, and instability, U.S. policy-makers must include Africa in an overall plan to counter this threatening strategic environment. The increased strategic importance of Africa has prompted the President to approve the activation of the sixth Geographic Combatant Command, Africa Command (AFRICOM).
In order to succeed in meeting objectives that support U.S. national interests on the African continent, the U.S., in concert with NATO and EU members, should capitalize on the fundamental principles of one of NATO's most successful partnering initiatives, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. Implemented in 1994, PfP was designed to enhance stability and security throughout Europe. It provides a mechanism for civil and military cooperation and opens the way for other NATO partnering initiatives through bilateral cooperative agreements between NATO and partner countries. In 1994, there were 16 members of NATO. Today there are 26 countries in the Alliance, 10 of which were formerly Partnership countries. Further, there are 23 current Partnership for Peace (PfP) members, and 3 countries in the Membership Action Plan (a program that prepares aspiring countries for NATO membership). Since its inception, the PfP program has grown exponentially in the European theater.
Regardless of NATO's marked success with PfP and the pressing demands in Africa, NATO cannot blindly march into the African continent with the same strategy that has thrived in Europe. U.S. and NATO policy makers must scrutinize their partnering approach with the African countries; otherwise, they will not realize the successes gained in Europe. What must be changed in the current fundamental PfP principles in order to achieve success in Africa?
Given its tumultuous history and its inherent need for stability and security, the African continent is a prime candidate for partnering initiatives offered by NATO, similar to a PfP program. There are, however, unique considerations that must be taken into account before building partnerships in Africa. First, it must be clear that the African Partnership Initiative (API) is a distinct and separate program from the PfP. Bear in mind that one of the incentives for joining the PfP was the eventual prospect of joining NATO.
The basic framework of the API will not include NATO membership or a seat at the Euro-Atlantic Partnering Council (EAPC) in Brussels. Rather, the "alliance" that the API will build upon is the multilayered, regional security architecture of the African Union security plan. The capacity for expansion within this framework provides the greatest incentive to African leaders to embrace the API. Second, certain European Union (EU) countries are very hesitant about initiating or supporting programs on the African continent that are strictly NATO-centric. Third, the African Union (AU) must be a key player in any partnering initiative in order for the program to be viewed as credible and accepted by African leaders. Lastly, both NATO and the United States, especially the Department of Defense (DoD), given their extensive commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq, are currently reluctant to enter other challenging engagements. Thus, the overall NATO/US commitment of resources must be minimized, with the prospect of maximum return on investment. Acknowledging the difficulties of launching an API, this SRP contends that by observing the fundamental principles of the European PfP program and making appropriate adjustments, the United States can take the lead in an API that will allay concerns of European allies and African leaders and that will further U.S.
interests.
This SRP reviews and encapsulates the history of the PfP program, highlighting its achievements to date. Next, it analyzes the strategic importance of Africa and identifies the major U.S. strategic interests on the continent. It proposes modifications in the NATO PfP program to adapt it into a hybrid partnering program called the African Partnering Initiative (API). The API is designed to establish a stable and secure Africa, building on the current African Peace and Security Architecture. Lastly, given the increased strategic importance of Africa, this SRP discusses the role of the newest U.S.
Combatant Command, Africa Command (AFRICOM). The European PfP program, properly adjusted for Africa, can achieve the goals of increased security and regional stability, continued economic development, and reduced disease and strife on the continent. For these reasons, the United States should leverage the NATO-based • facilitate transparency in national defense planning and budgeting processes;
• ensure democratic control of defense forces;
• maintain the capability and readiness to contribute to crisis response operations under the United Nations and other international organizations;
• • According to representatives of the (then) three newest NATO member states (Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland), the partnering has provided immeasurable capacity building for indigenous forces to provide for their own security, as well as assistance in regional peacekeeping operations, an imperative for developing a partnering program with the Africans. Africa holds growing geo-strategic importance and is a high priority of this Administration. It is a place of promise and opportunity, linked to the United States by history, culture, commerce, and strategic significance. Our goal is an African continent that knows liberty, peace, stability, and increasing prosperity.
The United States recognizes that our security depends upon partnering with Africans to strengthen fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under the control of effective democracies.
Overcoming the challenges Africa faces requires partnership, not paternalism. Our strategy is to promote economic development and the expansion of effective, democratic governance so that African states can take the lead in addressing African challenges. We are committed to working with African nations to strengthen their domestic capabilities and the regional capacity of the AU to support post-conflict transformations, consolidate democratic transitions, and improve peacekeeping and disaster responses. Understanding this mindset of the African people is essential for establishing a strategy that seeks to achieve U.S. interests without being perceived as an intruder or resourcehungry power broker.
Although the U.S. has a number of bilateral initiatives with African countries, recent foreign policy actions have weakened U.S. influence in the international community, and among African leaders. The current and growing strategic import of Africa requires increased partnering with not only Africans but also with other international players.
The most notable international body capable of promoting legitimacy of action is the United Nations (UN). Another significant body that must be included in partnering discussions is the European Union (EU). Given Africa's proximity to Europe and possible spillovers from African instability, Europe is keen to support peace and prosperity in Africa. Additionally, as the EU builds security institutions (European Security and Defense Policy-ESDP) and pursues global ambitions, it has sought to carve out a role for itself as a capacity building partner on security issues with Africa.
To that end, the EU has leveraged its members' post-colonial African relationships, particularly those of France and the UK. It has also provided significant funding for development to build relationships on the continent. As a result of these efforts, the EU and some of its key members (ironically also NATO members) are hesitant to concede any leverage or positioning they have already established in Africa to a NATO-centric organization (with its accompanying U.S. influence). 13 However, some of our European be designed to achieve the following goals:
• Self-differentiation: The same criteria of the European construct for selfdifferentiation is crucial. Each state must craft a partnership that meets both the needs and capabilities of the aspiring African country. Partnership activities should be in the mutual interest of allies and partners, undertaken in the spirit of joint ownership, and demand-driven. They should also build on existing structures and programs, add value to existing bilateral and multilateral programs, and avoid duplication. First, open dialogue can prevent armed conflicts. Finally, it can end conflicts and contribute to post-conflict stability. It is imperative for the program to provide a forum for grievances and for dialogue to resolve outstanding issues.
• Partnering with the AU and other African regional organizations: The growing depth and reach of the African Union (AU) and various other African regional organizations demonstrates a renewed commitment to breaking free of the continent's history of violence and poverty. The nascent African Standby Force, with its five Regional Economic Community (REC)-affiliated brigades, offers a promising instrument for achieving "African solutions to African problems" in the security realm. 16 So, the API will work directly to support the sixth AU objective • Inclusiveness: Previous experiences have led African leaders to believe that they are often treated as second-class soldiers. They are not afforded leadership roles with security partners; they are often viewed merely as a provider of forces with little influence regarding the deployment of the forces. In order to obtain and maintain the commitment of African leaders, they must be included in all aspects of planning and implementation. Also, as noted earlier, the EU should likewise be involved in order to ensure their support of the initiative.
• Focused selectivity: In order to maximize the chances for success of the API, it should focus initially on partnerships with a small number of more advanced
African militaries, such as South Africa, Senegal, Rwanda, Ghana, Angola, Ethiopia, and possibly Nigeria.
• Minimal cultural or value pre-conditions: Central and Eastern European nations were required to sign formal documents imposing a commitment to democratization and good governance for admission to NATO. The cultural and trust gap between most African countries and Western nations is simply too wide for such demands to be placed on African countries at this time. The countries of the region will choose different paths toward democracy and modernization, and they will move at different speeds. They will resent anything that appears condescending or culturally imperialistic. 17 That being said, the partnership should demand a basic level of good governance that provides its citizens with protection from human rights violations and other oppressive conditions. Efforts to increase or influence cultural values will require collaboration and measured cultural sensitivity. Only after the API has taken root and started to mature and following a detailed analysis of the potential for success, should additional conditions be broached. If at all feasible, such issues will most likely be country-dependent: --that is, not applicable across the spectrum of partners.
• Coordination mechanism: One of the lessons learned from the PfP is the imperative to establish a coordinating mechanism which is responsible for centrally coordinating efforts, thereby ensuring synchronization of activities, resources and plans. In order to leverage cooperation and assure unity of effort, the coordination mechanism should include representatives from NATO, the EU, the AU, and participating partner states. The physical location of this mechanism should be negotiated.
• Regional capacity building: A key objective is to help interested countries make their military forces more capable and interoperable with other peacekeeping forces, based on NATO, UN and/or API-proposed standards. Investments in these programs can yield a long-term payoff of enhanced African conflict management capabilities, increased stability, and an effective means to safeguard the growing number of U.S. national interests on the continent.
• initiatives. 19 Once the API has begun to solidify and its structure takes form, other training opportunities can be introduced.
Efforts to complement rather than supplant indigenous initiatives may not only help to avoid the impression of neo-colonialism but may also prove important in helping the United States to compete with China and other countries for access to African resources and influence in the region. 20 Partnering with African countries via the AU (under the API), arguably, is the best way to gain and maintain legitimacy, and then to leverage the proven successes of the NATO PfP program.
African Peace and Security Architecture
As discussed earlier, in order for the API to take root and be accepted and adopted by African leaders, the initiatives should include African organizations and leverage their capabilities and current assets. Hence, it is not only prudent, but necessary, to review and join collaboratively with the African Union's Peace and Security Architecture. At the heart of Africa's attempts to assume responsibility for its collective security is the African respond to crises (see figure 2) . 21 Using this architecture, the API will link partnering initiatives to the goals of AU leaders. The PSC, the ASF, and the PW should be thoroughly integrated into the API. Perhaps one of the most promising features of the architecture is its multi-layered and symbiotic approach to security cooperation. The continental security plan relies on tiered regional security mechanisms. Regional security plans and capabilities serve collectively to contribute to an overarching continental plan, while maintaining regional autonomy. This allows the Peace and Security Council to capitalize on regional strengths and rely on established capabilities of the more highly developed militaries of Africa (e.g. South Africa). Under this system of decentralized collective security, the primary responsibility for peace and security remains squarely with the regional organizations, while the AU serves as the clearinghouse and framework for all initiatives, thereby filling the conceptual and institutional gap between global organization (the United Nations) and regional organization. Force and the EU Battle Groups. In current plans, each of Africa's five regions (North, East, South, West, and Central) will set up a brigade of about 3,000-5,000 troops, thereby providing the AU with a combined standby capacity of 15,000-25,000 troops trained and equipped according to common standards and operating to common doctrine. 23 The development and implementation of the ASF provides two specific advantages: First, it is rooted in an overarching security framework; second, the decentralized structure of the ASF uses the regional organizations' military and institutional capabilities rather than attempting to supplant or duplicate them. These promising characteristics of the ASF, as well as the ensuing institutional prospects for a continental peace and security architecture, provide the context for NATO/EU (and U.S.) military capacity building for peace operations in Africa today. Command (CENTCOM) region, will remain under the CENTCOM umbrella of responsibility. President Bush emphasized that this new command will strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and helps to create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa. AFRICOM will enhance our efforts to help bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa. 28 Intended to function differently than traditional unified combatant commands, AFRICOM will place capacity building in Africa at the center of its mandate. By integrating interagency contributions from the onset, AFRICOM will focus on war prevention rather than warfighting. AFRICOM will better enable the Department of Defense and other agencies of the U.S. government to work in concert and with partners to achieve a more stable environment in which political and economic growth can take place. 29 AFRICOM will work with African states and regional organizations to:
• Build partnership capacity;
• Support USG agencies in implementing security policies;
• Conduct Theater Security Cooperation activities;
• Increase partner counter-terrorism skills;
• Enhance humanitarian assistance, disaster mitigation, and response activities;
• Foster respect for human rights;
• Support African regional organizations; and Paramount to acceptance of the API is a clear understanding of concerns of both the Europeans and African leaders. The imperatives discussed throughout this paper will require dialogue that focuses on the collective and shared advantages for all participants in such an initiative. As long as the API focuses on the greater goals of capacity building, and supporting regional stability and security, and as long as it is based on helping Africans to maintain their autonomy, the program could pave the way for a stable, secure Africa. Measurements of the API's success will be different from the PfP in that the "alliance building" is not NATO-centric; it is multilayered and regionally based in Africa. The promise of this proposed program leaves us not only optimistic about the future of the African continent; it also strengthens the feasibility of achieving U.S. interests in this new "continent of strategic significance." Endnotes
